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Abstract 
Because research on the impact of web survey incentives has exclusively focused on Western 
settings, it is unclear to what extent current insights translate and generalize to non-Western 
societies, which are usually characterized by very different economic conditions, cultural 
traditions and survey climates. The current paper presents the results of a web survey 
incentives experiment among almost 4,440 Ghanaian university students who were offered 
conditional and unconditional incentives of different values (in the form of telephone credit). 
Our analyses partly replicate Western findings: higher value incentives produce higher 
participation rates and unconditional incentives outperform conditional ones in the lower 
value conditions. In the case of relatively high incentives, however, conditional outperform 
unconditional incentives. No differential effects of incentives on response quality were found.  
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Can Incentive Effects in Web Surveys be Generalized to Non-Western 
Countries? Conditional and Unconditional Cash Incentives in a Web 
Survey of Ghanaian University Students 
 
Introduction 
In a few years, research into the impact of incentives on survey participation will 
celebrate its centenary. As early as 1931, the first quasi-experimental study on including a 25-
cent coin in a mail survey was published by Shuttleworth (1931). Over the decades, countless 
survey experiments have gathered sound empirical evidence that incentives can be a powerful 
tool for increasing response rates (for meta-analyses see Auspurg & Schneck 2014; Church 
1993; Göritz 2006a; Edwards et al. 2002; Hopkins and Gullickson 1992; Singer et al. 1999; 
Yu & Cooper 1983). In a nutshell, available research convincingly shows that (1) incentives 
increase response rates, irrespective of the survey mode used; (2) unconditional (prepaid) 
incentives are more effective than conditional (promised) incentives; (3) monetary incentives 
are more effective than vouchers and in-kind incentives; and (4) the higher value of an 
incentive, the stronger is the effect it produces, albeit marginal returns diminish (Singer and 
Ye 2013). More recently, researchers have also started enquiring the effect of incentives on 
indicators of response quality, notably on item nonresponse (Curtin, Singer, and Presser 2007; 
Davern et al. 2003; Medway 2012). 
Although the quantity of empirical evidence is impressive, the available research is 
geographically – and as a result also culturally – very strongly clustered. The vast majority of 
studies were carried out in the U.S. or – to a lesser extent – in other Anglo-Saxon countries, 
such as Canada, the UK or Australia, and a few Western European countries. This raises the 
question to what extent current knowledge regarding incentive effects can be translated cross-
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nationally (Blom, Jäckle, and Lynn 2010; Couper and de Leeuw, 2003). After all, “the 
meaning of gifts as well as monetary incentives is likely to differ between cultures” (Singer et 
al. 1999, p. 219), and the scarce available comparative research suggests that even within the 
Anglo-Saxon world incentive effects show cross-national variation (Mutti et al. 2014). The 
generalizability of incentive effects beyond the Western world raises even greater question 
marks, in particular, in the context of web surveys. How effective are incentives in web 
surveys in non-Western societies that are characterized by very different economic conditions, 
cultural traditions and survey climates?  
The present study contributes to this field by analysing an incentives experiment 
implemented in the National Service Scheme Survey (N3S), a web survey conducted between 
in August 2014 among 4,440 Ghanaian university students, who were offered conditional and 
unconditional incentives of different values. The incentives were quasi-cash, in the form of 
top-up credits for mobile phones, a typical means of transferring small amounts of money in 
Ghana. We examine whether and to what extent the web survey incentives have an impact on 
survey participation and response quality. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first 
to report the results of a web survey incentives experiment in an African country. It, therefore, 
sheds light on whether the well-documented findings from Western countries can be 
transferred to non-Western settings. 
This paper commences with a brief review of the theory and previous research on the 
impact of incentives on response rates and data quality in Western countries. In the theory 
section, we also elaborate on the specificity of the Ghanaian context and derive research 
hypotheses. Subsequently, we describe the design of the study and present our results. We 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our study. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Effects of Incentives on Response and Response Quality: Theoretical Perspectives 
In the context of unit nonresponse, leverage-salience theory stresses that decisions to 
accept or refuse partaking in a survey depend on a wide array of factors – such as topic, 
sponsorship, expected time investment, concerns about privacy, perceived benefits and 
community involvement – that have “different ‘leverages’ on the cooperation decision for 
different persons” (Groves, Singer and Corning 2000, p. 306). One of these levers that can be 
relatively easily operated by survey designers is giving incentives to respondents. Numerous 
studies have successfully used incentives – varying in form (monetary vs. in kind) and 
conditionality (unconditional vs. conditional; Church 1993) – to stimulate survey response.  
To explain the effectiveness of incentives on response rates, two theoretical 
frameworks that stress different mechanisms – namely self-interest vs. norms of reciprocity – 
compete for attention (Singer and Ye 2013). First, according to rational choice-based 
approaches, such as exchange theory (Homans 1950) or the theory of reasoned action 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), individual behaviour is rooted in rational cost-benefit calculations 
(Alwin 1991: 17-18; Philipson 1997; Singer 2011). Providing an incentive to respondents 
adds to the benefit-side, and consequently increases the probability that a person will take part 
in the survey. This rational choice-approach stresses the importance of the monetary value 
and conditionality of incentives. The more valuable an incentive is, the higher the probability 
that it can tip the balance in favour of survey participation. The incentive should only be 
provided conditional upon completion of the survey. Once handed over, the incentive 
disappears from the cost-benefit equation and it is no longer in the self-interest of the 
respondent to cooperate. 
A second approach contradicts the premise that the effectiveness of incentives can be 
fully understood by referring to the realm of the economic only. Providing incentives is not a 
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neutral transaction of economic value, but establishes a social relation of trust and appeals to 
the principle of the Gift (Mauss 1923). Incentives establish a norm of reciprocity: They create 
a moral obligation to reciprocate the favour by participating in the survey (Gouldner 1960). 
Even small symbolic values can be effective, and the incentive should be given prior to 
participation in the survey (i.e. unconditionally; Dillman 2000).  
Incentives do not only affect the decision to participate in a survey, but could also 
have an impact on response behaviour during the survey. Reasoning along the two theoretical 
frameworks presented above, contrasting expectations have been uttered (Singer and Ye 
2013). Some scholars have expressed the concern that incentives might have detrimental 
effects on response quality, because they persuade sample units who would otherwise have 
refused to respond. Assuming that incentives affect the decision to participate but not the 
respondents’ motivation, these respondents lack internal motivation and might therefore not 
fill out the survey carefully, which leads to incomplete data of low quality (Davern et al. 
2003; Deutskens et al. 2004; Göritz 2006a). Hansen (1980, p. 78) uses self-perception theory 
to explain such quality-reducing effect of incentives: External motivators (such as incentives) 
impede respondents from perceiving themselves as cooperative persons, which results in less 
effort during the survey. If, however, incentives activated a norm of reciprocity, their 
effectiveness would not be confined to the cooperation decision, but would instead extend 
across the whole survey. In this case, incentives would stimulate respondents to provide more 
complete and adequate information, and improve response quality (Davern et al. 2003).  
 
Empirical Evidence From the Western World 
 In the Western World (mostly the U.S.), the theoretical propositions on incentive 
effects have been tested elaborately among the general population as well as more specific 
samples –such as adolescents (Jäckle and Lynn 2008), university students (Shettle and 
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Mooney 1999; van Veen, Göritz, and Sattler 2016), or even earthquake engineers (Birnholtz 
et al. 2004). Several reviews (Simmons and Wilmot 2004; Singer and Ye 2013) and meta-
analyses (Armstrong and Lusk 1987; Church 1993; Göritz 2006a; Heberlein and Baumgartner 
1978; Singer et al. 1999; Yu and Cooper 1983) reveal a general pattern that confirms 
components of both theoretical frameworks. Incentives tend to motivate respondent 
cooperation, irrespective of whether the survey is interviewer-mediated (Singer et al. 1999), 
administered via mail (Church 1993) or web (Göritz 2006a) and of whether data-collection is 
cross-sectional or longitudinal (Jäckle and Lynn 2008).  
The exact effectiveness of an incentive, however, depends on its form, conditionality, 
and value. Prepaid (unconditional) incentives are found to be considerably more effective at 
increasing response rates than promised (conditional) incentives (Singer et al. 1999; Yu and 
Cooper 1983), even when keeping the overall costs equal (e.g. Blom, Gathmann and Krieger 
2015). Some studies even report that promised incentives do not yield higher response rates 
than no-incentive comparison groups (e.g. Church 1993). Equally in line with the reciprocity-
argument is that incentives with small, symbolic value already increase response 
substantially. Higher values, however, tend to produce stronger response-inducing effects, 
which can be understood from rational choice theory. Empirical evidence on the functional 
form of the relationship between incentive value and response rates is mixed. While some 
studies report that response increases linearly with incentive values (Church 1993; Yu and 
Cooper 1983; Gelman, Stevens & Chan 2003), others report diminishing marginal returns 
(Dillman 2000; Singer et al. 1999) and are no longer effective beyond a certain threshold 
(James and Bolstein 1992). Finally, cash incentives have stronger motivating effects than 
incentives in kind of the same value (Singer et al. 1999; Yu and Cooper 1983), which 
supports the economic argument. 
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The effect size of incentives also depends on the survey mode. Regarding unit 
nonresponse, incentives tend to be most effective in mail surveys. Church’s (1993) meta-
analysis reveals that prepaid incentives of small value (mean value 1.38$) increase response 
rates by 19.1 percentage points, which implies a 65% bump in response rate (effect size 
d=.347). Singer et al. (1999) report that, across 39 interviewer-mediated surveys, every dollar 
of incentive paid yields more or less one third of a percentage point in response rate. A 
possible explanation for this considerably weaker effect might be that interviewer-mediated 
surveys generally have higher base-line response rates.  
With regards to web surveys, a meta-analysis by Göritz (2006a) shows that the odds of 
starting and completing a web survey increase with 19% and 27%, respectively 
(corresponding to effect sizes d of .10 and .13), when an incentive is provided. The 
comparatively weak effects in web surveys might be related to the difficulty of establishing 
trust over the internet combined with the fact that it is practically difficult to provide cash 
incentives to online respondents. Web-suitable unconditional incentives (such as payments 
through PayPal or vouchers for online purchases) often require relatively lengthy procedures 
and high levels of internet literacy (Bosnjak and Tuten 2003) or an offline pre-recruitment 
phase, where addresses of sample units, to which the unconditional incentive can be sent, are 
collected (Scherpenzeel and Toepoel 2012). The few studies on unconditional cash incentives 
(Bosnjak and Tuten 2003; Scherpenzeel and Toepoel 2012) show mixed results.	
Whereas there is abundant evidence for response-increasing effects of (unconditional 
monetary) incentives, fewer studies look into the relationship between incentives and 
response quality. Often-used indicators of response quality are (the absence of) item 
nonresponse or the length of answers in open-ended questions (Singer and Ye, 2013). Various 
studies report that the use of incentives does not affect item nonresponse (e.g. Curtin et al. 
2007; Davern et al. 2003; Göritz 2004; Petrolia and Bhattacharjee 2009; Teisl, Roe and Vayda 
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2005), while others find that incentives motivate respondents to complete all questions 
(Bosnjak and Tuten 2003; James and Bolstein 1990; Medway 2012; Singer, van Hoewyk and 
Maher 2000). In any case, the available research does not support the argument that giving 
out incentives harms response quality. If they have any effect on response quality, incentives 
seem to strengthen rather than to undermine respondents’ motivation. The effect of different 
types of incentives on response quality remains unclear. 
Potential Differences in the Ghanaian Context 
 A crucial limitation in the field is that available research tends to be restricted to the 
U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries. Although recent efforts have been undertaken to 
generalize the findings to other Western-European countries (for example to Germany; see 
Pforr et al. 2015) or Russia (Avdeyeva & Matland 2013), studies that test the effectiveness of 
incentives beyond the Western world – in particular with respect to web surveys – are very 
scarce. 
 In this study, we explore to what extent current knowledge on incentive effects can be 
generalized to non-Western contexts, in particular to the case of web survey incentives in 
Ghana. Due to the specificity of the Ghanaian context, there are plausible theoretical reasons 
to expect that web survey incentives may produce different effects from those in Western 
contexts (for similar arguments, see Avdeyeva & Matland 2013). In particular, we anticipate 
that differences in economic conditions, the cultural traditions and customs, and the general 
survey climate in Ghana might have an impact on the effectiveness of incentives. First, 
concerning the economic conditions, it is worthwhile to highlight here that Ghana is a 
developing country with a GNI per capita of $1,480 (Atlas Method, current US$) and an 
estimated poverty headcount ratio of 24.2% in 2015 (World Development Indicators). While 
university students (i.e. our research population) generally constitute a relatively privileged 
section of Ghanaian society, a considerable proportion of them nonetheless faced serious 
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socioeconomic hardship during their youth and quite a few students continued to have 
difficulties making ends meet. Illustratively, 39.3% of students interviewed as part of our 
survey mentioned that during their childhood they had gone without food “occasionally” or 
“frequently” because their family lacked money. In addition, 62.6% of interviewed students 
mentioned that they had struggled in past years to pay for their university education. Given 
these difficult and uncertain economic circumstances and living conditions, we would expect 
from a rational choice or exchange theory perspective that people would be more willing to 
participate in activities through which they can generate additional income. Furthermore, 
compared to the relative standard of living, the incentives used are quite large, and as a result 
the conditional monetary incentives may well have stronger effects in Ghana compared to 
Western settings (Avdeyeva & Matland 2013: 176).  
Second, important cultural differences may also contribute to differences in incentives 
effects. Traditionally, Ghanaian society has been characterized by a strong informal system of 
reciprocal exchange between family members, friends, neighbours, ethnic group members, 
etc. as a necessary means of survival (Hydén 2006). Furthermore, Ghana has been identified 
as one of the most religious countries worldwide (Ruiter & Van Tubergen 2009), which may 
positively influence societal norms concerning helping one’s fellow man and reciprocating 
favours, gifts, and assistance. These societal norms may in turn make people more inclined to 
participate in surveys upon receiving an unconditional monetary incentive. Furthermore, 
Ghana was found to be one of the least-trusting societies worldwide (Delhey, Newton and 
Welzel 2011), which might not only decrease response rates, but also undercut the 
effectiveness of conditional incentives (Avdeyeva & Matland 2013).  
A third factor which may affect the impact of incentives on survey participation is the 
survey climate; i.e. the societal-level factors that contribute to the willingness to participate in 
surveys (Groves and Couper 1998: 155). In this respect it is important to note that prospective 
 
WEB SURVEY INCENTIVES IN GHANA 10 
respondents in developing countries are not overburdened with surveys to the same degree as 
prospective respondents in Western settings. Consequently, we would expect relatively higher 
response rates in these non-Western settings, which in turn however may be associated with 
weaker incentives effects.   
Finally, one factor that may mediate the impact of incentives on survey participation in 
a Ghanaian web survey context is the difference in Internet infrastructure found in most Sub-
Saharan African countries compared to Western countries. While the Internet in Europe and 
Anglo-Saxon countries developed on the back of a landline telephone infrastructure, Sub-
Saharan countries rely more heavily on mobile phone technologies, not only for phone 
communication but also for the Internet (Aker & Mbiti 2010; De Bruijn 2009). Figure 1 
shows that in our survey of Ghanaian university students more than half of the respondents 
(53.4%) used mobile devices to participate in the web survey. In comparison, during the same 
period in Germany only 19.9% of the participants aged 20-25 in the German Internet Panel 
used mobile devices (Blom, Herzing, Cornesse, Sakshaug, Krieger, & Bossert 2016). At the 
same time, methodologists have found mobile web participants less likely to respond to 
survey requests (e.g. Mavletova 2013; de Bruijne & Wijnant 2013). Since sample members, 
however, were invited to the survey via both email and text message, the mobile mode is 
made particularly attractive. Incentives effects for mobile web surveys are largely unexplored, 
even in Western countries (cf. Mavletova & Couper 2016). Given the specific mobile survey 
setting in African countries, the effects of conditional and unconditional cash incentives may 
differ from effects found in Western countries.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
Hypotheses 
Due to the relative scarcity of previous research on survey incentives in non-Western 
contexts, the character of our study is necessarily exploratory, and contrasting hypotheses can 
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be derived. Building upon the findings obtained in a Western context, we expect that 
unconditional incentives yield higher response rates than conditional ones (H1), that higher 
incentive values will lead to higher response rates (H2a), and that additional value increases 
have diminishing returns in terms of response (H2b). Response quality will be higher in 
conditions with unconditional incentives (H3) and with incentives of higher values (H4). Due 
to specific contextual factors, however, the effectiveness of incentives in Ghana may differ 
from Western contexts. On the one hand, because of the unfavourable economic context, 
conditional incentives could possibly be more effective than unconditional ones in Ghana 
(H5). Finally, the favourable survey climate could lead to a high baseline response rate, with 
little differences between the various incentive conditions (H6).   
 
Data & methods 
Data Set: the National Service Scheme Survey (N3S) 
The N3S surveys prospective participants in Ghana’s National Service Scheme (NSS). The 
NSS is a compulsory national service program, which requires all Ghanaian students who 
obtain a Bachelor degree to complete one year of national social service, usually outside their 
area of origin. The purpose of the N3S is to study the extent to which Ghana’s NSS program 
contributes to improving inter-group relations and fostering stronger national identities among 
its participants. To gather information before and after participation in the NSS, we 
implemented a three-wave online panel of two cohorts of Ghanaian students. We sampled 3rd 
and 4th year Bachelor students from three public universities with a wide ethno-regional 
spread (University of Ghana in Legon, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and 
Technology in Kumasi, and University for Development Studies with campuses at Tamale, 
Nyampkala, Wa and Navrongo) and a variety of bachelor programs - agriculture, 
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administration, chemistry, computer sciences, economics/development studies, engineering, 
English, nursing, geography, and politics (see Figure 1 for details on the sampling process).  
In a first stage, we visited a mandatory 3rd and 4th year course for each of the Bachelor 
programs. At the beginning of the class, we asked students to fill out a 4-page paper-and-
pencil questionnaire. The main purpose of this in-class survey was to obtain email addresses 
and phone numbers from the students so that they could be invited to participate in the web 
survey. The other questions in this background questionnaire give valuable information on the 
students, which we use in the analyses below. In total, 5,825 students completed the 
questionnaire. Only a very small number of students refused to participate in the survey, 
either by not accepting a questionnaire, or by handing it back empty.  
In a second stage, the 5,570 students who filled out the background questionnaire were 
invited by email and text message to participate in an online survey. The incentives 
experiment reported here concerns participation in this second stage of the survey, i.e. the first 
web survey.  
This two-stage procedure has the considerable advantage that background information 
is available for respondents as well as non-respondents in stage 2. A drawback is that our 
results do not concern the whole population of university students, but are conditional on 
participation in the first stage. However, based on information provided by the professors 
about class attendance and the low refusal rate, we estimate to have covered 80-90% of all 
students enrolled in the selected programs. 255 students did not provide a valid email address, 
and 1,130 invitation emails bounced,i leaving us with a sample of 4,440 students. Our final 
sample consists of 64.6% male students, and has a mean age of 23.29 years (std = 2.84). 
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Experimental Design 
Cash incentives – especially pre-paid ones – are notoriously difficult to deliver to 
respondents (Wetzels et al.  2008), especially in web surveys (Bosnjak and Tuten 2003; 
Couper 2000). However, the Ghanaian social context offered an interesting opportunity: 
quasi-cash incentives as mobile phone credit, so-called “top-up”. In Ghana, top-ups are easily 
transmittable and used almost universally as a mode of economic exchange. Top-ups thus are 
a functional equivalent of cash in Ghana.  
 Our experimental design varies both the value and the conditionality of cash incentives 
(see Figure 2). Regarding the value of incentives, students either received a mobile top-up of 
5, 10 or 20 Ghanaian Cedi’s (GHS) (50%, 25% and 25% of the sample, respectively). These 
amounts correspond to approximately €1.20, €2.40 and €4.80. 5 GHS is the price of a dinner 
in a campus restaurant, while 20 GHS buys a bus ticket to travel from Accra to Kumasi 
(roughly 250 km). Given that university students are a privileged section of Ghanaian society, 
the incentives we offered were relatively small compared to their spending patterns. With 
respect to conditionality, the three value-conditions were fully crossed. For students receiving 
an unconditional incentive, the mobile phone top-up – together with a text message indicating 
that the top-up was meant as a token of gratitude for their participation in the survey – was 
sent to the respondents’ phones just before they received the survey invitation by email. 
Respondents in a conditional incentive condition received a text message saying that they 
would receive a top-up upon completing the survey. Note that the experimental design does 
not contain a no-incentive comparison group. The reason is that, given the previous research 
in the Western World, there were strong expectations that giving no incentives at all would 
lead to lower response, which could have damaged the data quality of the N3S research 
project. 
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Because classmates are likely to communicate with each other and differences in 
amounts might be perceived as unfair (Singer and Ye 2013), we decided to randomize classes 
of students enrolled in the same bachelor program rather than individual students over the six 
experimental conditions. In order to obtain a balanced distribution with respect to relevant 
covariates, 64 class-groups were allocated to the six conditions (see Figure 2) using covariate-
adaptive randomization (Hu et al. 2014). Specifically, the size of the group, the bachelor year, 
the university and the discipline were taken into account in this randomization. As a 
consequence, the experimental group sizes in terms of individuals differ slightly from the 
projected sizes. 
 
Indicators 
 In the context of a web survey, it is useful to distinguish between three indicators of 
survey participation. A first indicator is the starting rate, i.e. the percentage of the invited 
sample units that started the survey (i.e. clicked on the invitation link, and loaded at least the 
first page of the survey). Second, we look at the completion rate (for a similar approach, see 
Göritz 2006b). This is the percentage of starters that actually complete the survey (i.e. reach 
the final survey page). As such, completion is the counterpart of drop-out. The distinction 
between starting rate and completion rate makes it possible so disentangle incentive effects on 
different states of the survey process. Third, we analyse the response rate, defined as the 
percentage of invited sample units that completes the survey (i.e. reaches the last page). The 
response rate is a general indicator that combines incentive effects of the different phases in 
the survey process (starting and completing) and reveals the impact of incentives up to the 
end of the questionnaire. 
Response quality is operationalized by means of two concrete indicators. First, this 
study includes the most often-used measure of response quality in incentive research, namely 
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the prevalence of item nonresponse. Concretely, we calculate the percentage of missing 
answers over a set of 85 items that were presented to all respondents (thus not included in 
routings or filters). Second, we analyse the occurrence of so-called straight-lining, i.e. of 
selecting the same response option for a set of items that are presented jointly in a matrix 
question, such that the responses form a straight vertical line on the screen. Straight-lining is 
often seen as an indicator of satisficing (Kaminska, McCutcheon and Billiet 2010). The N3S 
contains 11 item batteries, each consisting of multiple items that use the same answer scale 
and are presented on the same screen. For each respondent, we calculated the percentage of 
scales on which straight-lining behaviour was observed. To avoid confounding response 
quality and survey participation, the indicators of response quality were calculated only for 
respondents who completed the survey (N = 2,892). 
 In order to control for the differential composition of the class groups, the model 
controlled for the following background variables: gender, age (in years), ethnicity (i.e. a self-
classification into the major ethnic groups in Ghana), university, year of study (3rd vs 4th BA 
year) and the answer on the question whether they look forward to their national service (on a 
scale from 0 – not at all to 10 – very much). Especially the latter two variables are of interest. 
Given 4th year students were invited to take the survey four weeks before the start of their 
national service, and given that the national service is the topic of the N3S, these variables 
indicate topic salience and attitude towards the topic of the survey.  
 Descriptive statistics for all variables used can be found in the Appendix. 
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Results 
Effects of incentives on survey participation 
Table 1 and Figure 2 present the starting, completion and response rates for each of the 
six incentive conditions. First, at face value the incentive conditions show substantively 
relevant variation in starting rates. The difference between the condition with the lowest 
proportion of starters – as expected the promised 5 GHS condition – and the condition with 
the highest starting rate (prepaid 10 GHS) is 14 percentage points, and the corresponding odds 
ratio equals 1.91. Notwithstanding a notable exception, the pattern of differences in starting 
rates confirms current knowledge. Generally speaking, unconditional incentives seem to be 
more successful in motivating respondents to start the survey: For each of the values, the 
starting rate for the prepaid incentive is higher than the one for the promised incentive 
(although the difference in the 20 GHS-conditions is marginal). Second, higher amounts 
indeed seem to lead to higher starting rates. At the same time, the starting rates suggest 
diminishing returns to value increases. For the conditional incentives, moving from 10 to 20 
GHS yields about the same increase in starting rate as moving from 5 to 10 GHS, while the 
value increase is twice as large. In case of the unconditional incentives, moving from 10 to 20 
GHS even leads to a decrease in the starting rate. It is not clear whether this surprising result 
is due to sampling fluctuations or reveals a substantively relevant pattern. James and Bolstein 
(1992) also report that their highest prepaid incentive – a 40$ check included in a mail survey 
– results in lower response than lower denominations. James and Bolstein (1992, p. 447) refer 
to Dillman (1978) to argue that incentives can become too large: “The closer the monetary 
incentive comes to the value of the service performed, the more the transaction tends to move 
into the realm of economic exchange and the easier it becomes for many people to refuse it” 
(Dillman 1978, p. 16). 
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The completion rates reveal a very different dynamic. First, completion rates tend to 
be slightly higher for the promised than for the prepaid incentives (although differences are 
very small). Apparently, prepaid incentives are more successful in stimulating Ghanaian 
students to start the survey, while promised incentives are a slightly stronger motivating factor 
not to drop out. This seems to contradict a meta-analysis of Western web surveys that found 
that prepaid and promised incentives have a very similar effect on completion (Göritz 2006a, 
p. 64). Second, the differences in completion rates are neatly aligned with the value of the 
incentives: The conditions with higher incentives show higher completion rates. 
 The combined effect of both processes – starting and not dropping out – is visible in 
the overall response rate. Three conditions, namely prepaid 10 GHS, prepaid 20 GHS and 
promised 20 GHS, produce very similar response rates and outperform the worst condition 
(promised 5 GHS). The remaining two conditions –prepaid 5 GHS and promised 10 GHS – 
associate with medium response rates.  
(Table 1 & Figure 2 about here) 
 
 However, the results presented in Table 1 and Figure 2 should be interpreted with 
great caution. First, it remains to be seen to what extent the reported differences in survey 
cooperation are statistically significant. And second, the reported figures are flat averages, 
without taking into account the fact that class groups – with varying compositions in terms of 
individuals’ characteristics – are randomized over the experimental conditions rather than 
individuals. In order to calculate the significance of the incentive effects, taking into account 
the clustered nature of the data into account and controlling for differential compositions of 
classes, we make use of multilevel analysis (Hox 2010). Table 2 presents the results of 
multilevel logistic regression models for each of the three dichotomous indicators of survey 
cooperation (namely start, completion and response). The models reveal statistically 
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significant differences in the three indicators of survey cooperation between the incentives 
conditions, although controlling for individual characteristics leads to certain changes in the 
pattern of differences.  
Regarding the starting rate (see Model 1), three conditions – prepaid 10 GHS, prepaid 
20 GHS and promised 20 GHS – significantly outperform the reference condition (promised 5 
GHS). Although the prepaid 5 GHS-condition yields a slightly higher starting rate than the 
promised 5 GHS-condition (odds ratio: 1.23), it cannot be ruled out that this difference is due 
to chance. Controlling for individual background of the respondents, a promised incentive of 
20 GHS seems to have the strongest effect on survey participation. However, pairwise 
comparisons show that there are no significant differences in starting rate between prepaid 10 
GHS, prepaid 20 GHS and promised 20 GHS. Furthermore, females, younger students and 
4th-year students (for whom the survey topic on the national service is more salient) are more 
likely to start the survey. 
Promised incentives with higher values (10 and 20 GHS) lead to significantly higher 
completion rates than the promised 5 GHS group (see Model 2). None of prepaid incentive 
conditions, however, deviate significantly from the baseline. Apparently, the prospect of 
receiving a sizeable top-up motivates Ghanaian students to complete the survey, whereas just 
having received a top-up produces no such effect. Regarding effects of background variables, 
completion rates are lower among females and students at the University of Kumasi (for 
which we have no explanation). Contrary to the starting rate, the completion rate shows no 
significant variation at the class-group level. This suggests that the decision to start the survey 
has a class dynamic: Probably, the decision to start with the survey is made public in the 
group of peers via communication between classmates, which can reinforce the norm of 
reciprocity. The decision to (dis)continue the survey, conversely is done privately and boils 
down to a purely individual decision. 
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These differentiated patterns of starting and retaining are reflected in the impact of 
incentives on overall response rates (Model 3). As a result of the high starting rate combined 
with a high completion rate, the promised 20 GHS condition has the highest response rate 
(OR = 2.37). The response rate does not only have a higher proportion completers than the 
baseline condition of 5 GHS promised; Pairwise comparisons indicate that the response rate 
of the promised 20 GHS-group is higher than in any other incentive condition. Furthermore, 
prepaid incentives of 10 and 20 GHS turn out to increase overall response rates significantly 
beyond the level of the promised 5 GHS condition. 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Effects of incentives on response quality 
 Incentives can effectively motivate Ghanaian students to start taking a web survey and 
to prevent them from dropping out. However, might incentives have unfavourable 
consequences for the quality of responses provided? In this section, we systematically 
compare two indicators of response quality – item nonresponse and straight-lining – across 
incentive conditions (see Table 1).  
 Our results indicate that there is little reason to believe that incentives produce harmful 
effects on data quality. The percentage of items left blank across the survey varies less than 
two percentage points across the incentive conditions. Furthermore, this variation in item 
nonresponse shows no clear pattern across incentive condition. The lowest proportion of item 
nonresponse is found for the promised 10 GHS condition, while the highest level is found for 
the promised 20 GHS, which we would have expected to trigger very similar effects. 
Furthermore, for straight-lining between-condition differences are rather small and not clearly 
patterned. The lowest prevalence is found among respondents in the prepaid 20 GHS-
condition, who show straight-lining behaviour on 18.87% of the scales. The highest 
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percentage of straight-lining is found among respondents in the promised 10 GHS-group with 
21.11% of scales.  
 In order to take the clustering of the data (students within classes) and the 
compositional differences of classes into account, we again analysed the proportions of item 
nonresponse and straight-lining per respondent with multilevel models. Multilevel regressions 
confirm that there is no relationship between the incentive conditions and the indicators of 
response quality investigated. Neither item nonresponse, nor straight-lining shows any 
significant differences across the incentive groups (for detailed results, see Appendix Table 
2).   
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
Numerous studies into the impact of incentives on survey participation have 
convincingly shown that (1) incentives increase response rates; (2) unconditional (prepaid) 
incentives are more effective than conditional (promised) incentives; (3) monetary incentives 
are more effective than vouchers and in-kind incentives; and (4) the higher value of an 
incentive, the stronger is the effect it produces, albeit marginal returns diminish (Singer and 
Ye 2013). While unconditional prepaid incentives can be difficult to implement in web 
surveys, overall these findings apply to web surveys as well as other survey modes. In the past 
decade, scholars have expanded their scope of interest beyond the impact of incentives on 
survey participation and have started investigating the effect of incentives on indicators of 
response quality as well, notably on item nonresponse (see, for example, Curtin, Singer, and 
Presser 2007; Davern et al. 2003; Medway 2012). One major shortcoming of this prolific field 
of study, however, is the fact that all of these studies and empirical analyses have exclusively 
focused on Western settings. A crucial question, therefore, is: To what extent can we 
generalize and translate insights concerning incentive effects derived from these Western 
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settings to non-Western societies, which are usually characterized by very different economic 
conditions, cultural traditions and survey climates? The current paper addresses this important 
question, by analysing the results of a web survey incentives experiment conducted among 
4,440 Ghanaian university students, who were interviewed about their upcoming participation 
in their country’s National Service Scheme (NSS). 
Several important findings and conclusions emerge from our empirical analyses of the 
incentives experiment. First, the higher the value of an incentive, the more powerful it is to 
motivate respondents to start the web survey (confirming H2a), although we also find 
indications for diminishing marginal returns to increasing incentive values (confirming H2b). 
Second, in the conditions with incentives of lower values, unconditional incentives tend to 
outperform conditional incentives in encouraging respondents to start the web survey (thus 
partially supporting H1). These findings largely replicate previous research performed in 
Western context (for similar conclusions regarding a postal survey in Russia, see Avdeyeva & 
Matland 2013). One particular finding, however, contradicts prevailing Western knowledge. 
Unexpectedly, we found that the providing high (20 GHS) conditional incentives yielded the 
highest response rate (which is in line with H5). The expectation of a high incentive that will 
be offered upon completion of the survey not only motivates Ghanaian students to start, but 
also prevents them from breaking off the survey. This deviating finding can probably be 
explained by the difficult economic context of Ghana and the constant need for many students 
to find financial resources to cover living expenses and college fees. The fact that a personal 
relationship between the research team and the students was already established prior to the 
web survey (during the in-class background survey) and word-of-mouth recommendations by 
fellow-students might have additionally created the trust level necessary for this conditional 
incentive to be so effective. Furthermore, we surprisingly detect that the promised 20 GHS 
condition does not outperform the baseline, and is nominally worse than the promised 10 
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GHS incentive. This suggests that unconditional incentives can become so large that they 
become perceived as purely economic transactions, making it easier to refuse participation 
(see also James & Bolstein 1992). Future research is needed to find out whether this is a 
reproducible finding, or rather a chance fluctuation. 
Regarding the quality of the data, providing differential incentives did not produce any 
significant effects (thus rejecting H3 and H4). Incentive value and conditionality were found 
to be unrelated to both, the amount of item nonresponse and straight-lining response 
behaviour.  
 Given the considerable differences between Western and non-Western settings in 
terms of the nature and state of the prevailing economic and livelihood conditions, the 
existing cultural traditions, customs and norms, and the general survey climate, it is revealing 
to observe that incentive effects concerning web survey participation appear to be largely 
similar across both settings. Because giving incentives to respondents is an important and 
relatively easy lever for survey designers, this finding is encouraging for survey practitioners 
in non-Western countries.  
However, it should be clear that our study design has a number of limitations and that 
considerably more research is needed to confirm the effectiveness of incentives in non-
Western contexts. Most notably, the results presented here are based on a survey among 
university students. Hence, we do not claim generalizability of the effectiveness of incentives 
in web surveys to the whole Ghanaian population. In fact, such a generalization would be 
rather meaningless given that large sections of the Ghanaian society have no access to the 
Internet. Yet, it remains to be seen to what extent our findings can be replicated among other 
groups in Ghana who are less educated and well-off, but nevertheless have access to the 
Internet on a regular basis. In line with rational choice theory, one could expect that among 
poorer individuals, unconditional incentives are even more effective than our results suggest. 
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Future research should also attempt to replicate these findings in other non-Western societies. 
The findings presented here cannot settle the issue on differences between Western and non-
Western societies definitively. A second limitation is that we decided to randomize class 
groups rather than individuals across the conditions in order to pre-empt class dynamics and 
contacts between classmates. Although our models control for differences in demographic 
composition, this decision has decreased statistical power substantially. Finally, although 
mobile top-ups are almost equivalent to cash in Ghana, further investigation is needed to 
check whether the provision of real cash incentives would produce different results. 
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Figure 1. Participation on mobile and computer devices in the N3S survey of Ghanaian 
students 
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Table 1. Indicators of survey response and data quality by incentives condition 
Condition 
Starting   Completion Response % item 
nonresponse 
% straight-
lining Rate OR Rate OR Rate OR 
Prepaid 5 GHS 64.99 1.28 86.53 0.81 56.24 1.16 4.36 20.12 
Prepaid 10 GHS 73.49 1.91 89.30 1.05 65.63 1.72 3.51 19.95 
Prepaid 20 GHS 69.53 1.57 92.74 1.60 64.48 1.63 3.78 18.87 
Promised 5 GHS 59.25 
 
88.85 
 
52.64 
 
4.15 20.28 
Promised 10 GHS 63.23 1.18 93.18 1.71 58.91 1.29 3.27 21.11 
Promised 20 GHS 68.31 1.48 94.58 2.19 64.61 1.64 4.68 20.73 
N 4440 2892 4440 2660 2660 
Note. OR: Odds ratio, compared with the theoretically worst incentive condition (conditional 5 GHS) 
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Table 2.  Multilevel logistic regression models for starting the survey, completion and overall 
response (estimated odds ratios and their 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Model 1: Starting rate Model 2: Completion rate Model 3: Response rate 
 
Exp(B) 95% CI Exp(B) 95% CI Exp(B) 95% CI 
Intercept 6.16*** (3.01; 12.61) 6.20* (1.37; 28.13) 3.64*** (1.81; 7.34) 
Incentive 
      Prepaid 5 GHS 1.23 (0.94; 1.62) 1.01 (0.71; 1.43) 1.21 (0.94; 1.56) 
Prepaid 10 GHS 1.63** (1.17; 2.28) 0.85 (0.56; 1.30) 1.48* (1.09; 2.01) 
Prepaid 20 GHS 1.43* (1.07; 1.93) 1.39 (0.88; 2.18) 1.47** (1.12; 1.95) 
Promised 5 GHS (ref.cat.) 
   
(1.02; 2.92) 
  Promised 10 GHS 1.09 (0.80; 1.49) 1.72* 
 
1.17 (0.88; 1.57) 
Promised 20 GHS 2.00*** (1.33; 3.00) 3.15*** (1.74; 5.69) 2.37*** (1.63; 3.45) 
Gender 
      Male 1.39*** (1.20; 1.61) 1.32* (1.01; 1.73) 1.41*** (1.23; 1.63) 
Female (ref.) 
      Age 0.94*** (0.92; 0.97) 1.01 (0.96; 1.07) 0.95*** (0.93; 0.97) 
Ethnicity 
      Ga-Dangme 0.97 (0.78; 1.22) 1.12 (0.73; 1.72) 1.00 (0.80; 1.24) 
Ewe 1.16 (0.95; 1.41) 1.42 (0.95; 2.11) 1.24* (1.02; 1.50) 
Guan 0.79 (0.54; 1.16) 1.33 (0.57; 3.14) 0.87 (0.60; 1.27) 
Gurma 1.19 (0.79; 1.79) 1.16 (0.49; 2.75) 1.22 (0.82; 1.81) 
Mole-Dagbani 0.99 (0.75; 1.30) 1.06 (0.61; 1.85) 1.00 (0.77; 1.30) 
Grusi 0.92 (0.51; 1.65) 1.68 (0.39; 7.20) 1.00 (0.57; 1.77) 
Mande 1.23 (0.54; 2.83) 1.86 (0.24; 14.20) 1.34 (0.60; 3.00) 
Akan (ref.) 
      Year of study 
      3rd BA 0.61 (0.50; 0.74) 0.92 (0.69; 1.21) 0.64*** (0.53; 0.77) 
4th BA (ref.) 
      University 
      UG - Accra 1.19 (0.93; 1.52) 0.79 (0.51; 1.23) 1.10 (0.87; 1.39) 
KNUST - Kumasi 1.12 (0.85; 1.49) 0.46*** (0.29; 0.71) 0.91 (0.70; 1.19) 
UDS - Tamale (ref.) 
      Looking forward to NSS 1.00 (0.97; 1.03) 1.02 (0.97; 1.08) 1.00 (0.98; 1.03) 
       Variance class-level 0.220*** 0.000 0.169*** 
ICC 0.063 0.000 0.049 
N 4089 2709 4089 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Figure 2. Design of the N3S – including distribution of students and classes over the 
incentive conditions 
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Figure 3. Starting, completion and response rates by condition 
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Appendix Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
  
         %          N 
Condition 
Unconditional 5 GHS 22.39 994 
Unconditional 10 GHS 12.32 547 
Unconditional 20 GHS 13.38 594 
Conditional 5 GHS 28.96 1286 
Conditional 10 GHS 12 533 
Conditional 20 GHS 10.95 486 
Total 100 4440 
Started survey 
Yes 65.14 2892 
No 34.86 1548 
Total 100 4440 
Completed 
survey 
Yes 58.69 2606 
No 41.31 1834 
Total 100 4440 
Gender 
Male  64.55 2864 
Female 35.45 1573 
Total 100 4437 
Ethnicity 
Ga-Dangme 10.55 449 
Ewe 14.81 630 
Guan 3.2 136 
Gurma 2.94 125 
Mole-Dagbani 7.05 300 
Grusi 1.32 56 
Mande 0.71 30 
Akan 59.44 2529 
Total 100 4255 
Year of study 
3rd BA 48.41 2146 
4th BA 51.59 2287 
Total 100 4433 
University 
UG - Accra 42.82 1901 
KNUST - Kumasi 36.71 1630 
UDS - Tamale 20.47 909 
Total 100 4440 
            
 
Mean Std Dev Min Max N 
% item nonresponse 4.01 7.89 0 75.61 2606 
% straight-lining 20.15 15.13 0 90.91 2606 
Age 23.29 2.83 16 48 4316 
Looking forward to NSS 7.85 2.63 0 10 4387 
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Appendix Table 2. Multilevel regression models for indicators of response quality 
 
 
Model 4: Item non-
response 
Model 5: 
Straigthlining 
 
Par.Est. Par.Est. 
Intercept -5.91*** 19.04*** 
Incentive 
  Prepaid 5 GHS -0.12 -0.94 
Prepaid 10 GHS -0.57 -0.79 
Prepaid 20 GHS -0.19 -1.10 
Promised 5 GHS (ref.cat.) 
  Promised 10 GHS -0.72 0.32 
Promised 20 GHS 0.76 0.49 
Gender 
  Male -1.29*** -0.52 
Female (ref.) 
  Age 0.51*** -0.02 
Ethnicity 
  Ga-Dangme 0.05 0.42 
Ewe -0.36 0.32 
Guan -2.25* -0.52 
Gurma -2.28* 0.56 
Mole-Dagbani -1.7** -0.46 
Grusi -2.15 -2.05 
Mande 0.03 0.26 
Akan (ref.) 
  Year of study 
  3rd BA 1.55*** 0.35 
4th BA (ref.) 
  University 
  UG - Accra 0.29 1.53 
KNUST - Kumasi 0.04 1.30 
UDS - Tamale (ref.) 
  Looking forward to NSS -0.18** 0.15 
   Variance RI 0.00 1.54 
Residual var. 59.33*** 228.54*** 
ICC 0.000 0.007 
N 2446 2446 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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 																																																								i	By means of text messages, we were able to retrieve 528 correct email addresses for the 
respondents whose invitation mail bounced (which suggests that most incorrect email 
addresses were spelling/reading mistakes rather than deliberately fake addresses). Because the 
communication via text message might have interfered with the experimental manipulations, 
these respondents are not included in the analysis of incentive effects.	
